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Lemon v. Kurtzman 
Appeal from USDC ED Pennsylvania (hastie, Luongo, Troutman) 
This appeal--and two motions which I will discuss later--
~ 
~ circulated today and will be discussed at conference 
this Friday. This case arises out of the Court's land-
mark church-state opinion of last Term, holding unconsti--tutional a Pennsylvania statute authorizing the state to 
pay nonpublic schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and - ------------------- ---- -
supplies in secular courses. Upon holding the statute 
unconstitutional (8-0; per, CJ), the case was remanded to 
the three-judge ct in the USDC ED Pa for reconsideration 
in light of the Ct's opinion. The DC issued in December 
an Order granting the successful plaintiffs summary judg-
ment and enter~a partial permanent injunction prohibiting 
any future arrangements under the defunct statute. But, -
the DC refused to prohibit the State from paying some 
------~ 0 ,-
23 million dollars already promised to the schools under 
--2--
contracts which had been negotiated while the case was on 
• appeal (the 1970-71 school year). Appellants have per-
fected this appeal challenging this limitation in the 
DC's decision. 
The issue, as framed by the DC, was whether the de-
~ 
cision of this Court last Term was to be accorded full or 
limited retroactivity. The DC held that retroactivity is 
a matter to be determined by the courts and that it is a 
determination made essentially in a vacumn. The general 
rule recognized by the DC is that decisions are to be 
accorded full retroactivity but that when circumstances 
dictate, a case may be restricted to prospective appli-
cation. The DC then undertook to evaluate the basis of 
this Court's decision to determine whether the decision 
• itself required full retroactivity. Finding that no 
• 
real conflict with the basis of the opinion was created 
by prospectivity, the DC proceeded to "balance the 
equities" between the parites. The balance was struck in 
favor of allowing the private schools to receive the 
funds promised them under the contracts, despite the fact 
that the statute under which the expenditures were 




agreements were entered into, and despite the 




The Supreme Court opinion was based on the existence 
of "excessive entanglements" in the statutory scheme. The 
religious schools were required to keep separate account-
ing records which could be examined by state auditors in 





secular classes; the state was empowered to review the 
textbooks selected to determine that they had no reli-
gious overtones; the conduct of teachers could be, apparently, 
monitored to make sure that no religious leanings crept into 
secular coursework. Enforcing these restrictions--necessary 
to assure that the state was not "establisaing a religion"--
would require a great deal of state interference in the 
educational-religious process. Such extensive "contacts" 
were found impermissible. Appellees now contend that there 
are no entanglements involved in simply reimbursing the __ , 
religious nonpublic schools for last school term. Neither 
part y in this case--nor the DC--is very clear about the 
p~acticalities here. There is no statement as to exactly 
how the payments are to be made. For instance, is the 
state going to audit the schools' books before turning the 
money over to them, or has an audit already been under-
taken? Has the state already approved the textbooks or is 
the state going to review those texts as a condition to 
actual payment? What of the conduct of the individual 
teachers? What if a parent or other interested party tells 
~ 
the state officials that one tracher or another engaged in 
expositions on religious subjects during a natural history 
course last year? Should the state investigate and consider 
withholding payment on that ground? None of these 
questions is answered, although it is my inclination that 
the state presently contemplates nothing more than paying 
out the funds. It was precisely because the statute - -authorized such scrutiny, and because avoidance of a ---~~----
charge that the state was establishing religion mandated 





close scrutiny, that this Court struck down the statute, 
In the absence of the clearest showing that there will be 
no entanglement in this disbursement, I would hold the 
decision fully applicable to this fund, 
Nor does appellees• case seem particularly compelling __________ ,_ 
on the balancing-the-equities aspect, These contracts -
calling for the expenditure of state funds were entered into 
after the DC originally upheld the statute and after the 
~ 
appellants had filed their notiye of appeal in this Court, 
Both sides knew that the statute was of questionable 
constitutionality under prevailing precedents of this 
Court. Under such circumstances, the reliance argument 
seems weak. Moreover, it is not clear the extent to which 
the private schools embarked on programs, hired teachers, 
purchased books, etc that they would not have done but 
for the assurance of state reimbursement. It is my 
guess that much of the schools' activity _would have gone 
forward irrespective of state assistance, Finally, it is 
not sufficient for the schools to contend that they are 
financially strapped and in desperate need of aid, This 
is one of the facts of life that was forcefully presented 
to this Court before the decision was handed down, That 
fact cannot now compel a different result. 
While retroactivity questions often seem to raise 
difficult questions, I would adhere to the established rule 
that, absent compelling circumstances, c~nstitutional deci-- _____ _:;, _________ _ 
sions should have full applicability. Arguments of equity, 
reliance, and hardship should not countenance the commission 
of constitutional violation. Of course, to a healthy extent 
you may wish to defer to5the view of those Justices who 
were here last Term and participated in this case (Jus-
• tice Marshall did not participate) . 
• 
• 
In addition to the appeal, two motions have been 
filed. When the DC ruled in this case, it also entered a 
9O-day stay of its order, barring the state from paying 
over the monies until the case could be resolved by this 
Court. Appellants ask that if the case is not finally 
disposed of before May 22d, an extension of the stay should 
be granted, It goes almost without saying that unless a 
stay is maintained in effect pending resolution, the actual 
payment will virtually render the case moot, Therefore, if 
the case is not disposed of finally on Friday, you should 
vote in favor of the motion to extend the time. 
The appellees agree that the stay should remain in 
effect pending a final decision but they move that the case 
be given expedited consideration. By considering the case 
with such promptitude, the Court will be in effect grant-
ing that motion, 
RECOMMENDATION 
Obviously, the case should not be heard on the merits 
but should be handled by order. I recommend that the DC be -summarily reversed in a short Per Curiam, Also, to the 
extent that they are not mooted by the decision, both 
motions should be granted, 
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~aslpngfott. ;D. ~- 2Cl5J~.'.3 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
March 12, 1973 
Re : No . 71-1470 - Lemon v . Kurtzman 
Dear Chief: 
Please note at the foot of your opinion 
in this case that Mr. J usti c e White concurs in 
the j ud gment. 
Sincerely, 
~~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
vvA -
·/ 
Re: No. '11-1470 Lemon v. Kurtzman 





LAH 3/15/73 7/4 71-/<}7 tJ 
Re: Lemon v. Kurtzman 
Judge: 
I think there is no reason not to join the CJ's cir-
culated draft in this case. I looked closely at each of 
the arguments in an effort to discern why Justice White 
might have preferred to join only in the result. It now 
occurs to me that the most probable reason is that he 
dissented in Lemon I. The present opinion does go oack into 
the rationale of that case and discusses the application 
of the constitutional principle. 
If our chambers had been assigned this opinion, I would 
have urged you to write a shorter, narrower opinion. It 
seems to me that this case can be fairly disposed of 
entirely on the basis of a federal court's traditr:ilonal 
equitable power to fashion an appropria~e remedy. In 
exercising that prerogative the salient fact would be that 
appelleeants did not seek to enjoin enforcement of the 
law in the course of this litigation. The appellants 
even went so far as to state that they would withdraw their 
request for a preliminary injunction in recognition of 
the practical realities of the case. Under these circum-
stances, and in view of the fact that the constitutional 
judgment was not entirely foreclosed, I think the State 
could legitimately rely on the presumtively constitutionality 
of the law. All this could be said without (1) discussion 
of retroactivity, and (2) discussion of the constitutional 




.iu:prtmt ~ttUrl cf tJrt 'Jlfuilth j;taftg 
-asqmgton. ,. ~- . 2!lffe)1~ 
.JUSTI CE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
March is, 1973 
Re : No. 71-1470 - Lemon v. Kurtzman 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
-
~1.tp-reme <qmirt of trre 'J)!nitdt ;§tatcs 
'JiW as 11 ht.gt o it, P . <!J. 21l ,5 > 1-,3 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. March 22, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1470 - Lemon v. Kurtzman 
Dear Chief: 
In due course I plan to circulate a 
dissent in the above. 
The Chief Justice 
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/ 10: The Chief Ju~tioe 
1tr, Jw1rt100 Bren.nil.!'\ 
Ml', J\,JB'CJ-00 StewB.rt 
Mr, Juotioe Wbite 
2nd DRAFT Mr, Juo-tioe Marshi,.11 
Mr. Justice Blaokm~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA Moo Juet1ce Powell ~P Justice Rehnquist 
No. 71- 1470 From: Dougl&u, J . 
Alton J. Lemon et al. , 
Appellants, 
V. 
David H. Kurtzman , Etc., 
et al. 
Circulated: J Y~ -13 
On Appeal from the United 
States District ~firf~'¥otated: _____ _ 
the Eastern · District of 
P ennsylvania. 
[March -, 1973] 
MR. J USTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. 
There is as much a violation of the E stablishment 
Clause of the First Amendment whether the payment 
from public funds to sectarian schools involved last 
year, the current year, or next year. l\1adison in his 
Remonstrance stated "[T]he same authority which can 
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his p~op-
erty for the support of any one establishment, may force 
him to conform to any other establishment .... " 1 
Whether the grant is for teaching last year or at the 
present time taxpayers are forced to contribute to sec-
tarian schools a part of their tax dollars. 
The ban on that practice is not new. Lemon I, 403 
U. S. 602, did not announce a change in the la,Y. We 
had announced over and again that the use of taxpayers' 
money to support parochial schools violates the First 
Amendment, made applicable to the States by virtue of 
the Fourteenth. 
We said in unequivocal words in Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16, "No tax in any amount. large 
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities 
1 The Remonstrance is reprinted in 330 U. S., at 63 and in 397 




LEl\lON v. KURTZMAN 
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or what-
ever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 
"\Ve reiterated the sarne idea in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U.S. 306, 314, and in McGowan v. Maryland, 336 U.S. 
420, 443, and in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 493. 
We repeated the same idea in McCollum v. Board of 
Education, 333 U. S. 203, 210, and added that a State's 
tax-supported public schools could not be used "for the 
dissemination of religious doctrines" nor could a State 
provide the church "pupils for their religious classes 
through use of the States' compulsory public school 
machinery." Id. , at 212. 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN in his separate opinion in 
Lemon I put the matter succinctly when he said, 
" ... for more than a century, the consensus, en-
forced by legislatures and courts with substantial 
consistency, has been that public subsidy of sec-
tarian schools constitutes an impermissible involve-
ment of secular with religious institutions." 403 
U. S., at 648-649. 
So there was clear warning that those who proposed 
such subsidies were treading on unconstitutional ground. 
They can tender no considerations of equity that should 
allow them to profit from their unconstitutional venture. 
The issues presented in this type of case are often 
caught up in political strategies, designed to turn judi-
cial or legislative minorities into majorities. Lawyers 
planning trial strategies are familiar with those tactics. 
But those who use those tactics and lose have no equities 
that make constitutional what has long been declared to 
be unconstitutional. From the days of Madison the issue 
of subsidy has never been a question of the amount of 
the subsidy but rather a principle of no subsidy at all. 
The problems of retroactivity involved in criminal 
cases is therefore inapplicable. There the question is 
., 
71-1470-DISSE~T 
LEi\IO?\ v. KURTZMAN i) 
"·hether the newly announced rule goes to the fairness 
of the trial that had been completed under the old rule. 
See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-727. Here 
there is no new rule supplanting an old rule. The rule 
of no subsidy has been the dominant one since the days 
of Madison. We deal with the normal situation that 
governs judicial decisions. Normally they determine 
legal rights and obligations with respect to events that 
have already transpired. By definition courts decide 
disputes that have already arisen. A losing litigant has 
no equity in the fact that he "relied" on advice that 
turned out to be unreliable or wrong. 2 A decision over-
ruling a prior authority may at times deny a litigant due 
process if applied retroactively. See Brinkerhoff-Farrs 
Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673. Only a com-
pelling circumstance has been held to limit a judicial 
ruling to prospective applications. The disruptive effect 
in criminal law enforcement is one example. Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 300. Likewise a ruling on the 
legality of municipal bonds has been given only pro-
spective application where many prior bonds had been 
issued in good faith on a contrary assumption. Phoenix 
v. Kolo.dziejski, 399 U. S. 204, 213-215. 
Retroactivity of the decision in Lemon I goes to the 
very core of the integrity of the judicial process. Con-
stitutional principles do not ride on the effervescent argu-
ments advanced by those seeking to obtain unconstitu-
tional subsidies. The happenstance of litigation is no 
criterion for dispensing these unconstitutional subsidies. 
No matter the words used for the apologia, the subsidy 
2 The rule of Burton v. United States . 391 U. S. 123, which re-
jected D elli Paoli v. United States . 352 U. S. 232, was given retro-
spective effect. We said, "The element of reliance is not persunsive, 
for Delli Paoli has been under attack from its inception nnd rnnny 




LEMON v. KURTZMAN 
today given to sectarian schools out of taxpayers' monies 
exceeds by far the "three pence" which Madison con-
demned in his Remonstrance. 
I would reverse the judgment below and adhere to the· 
constitutional principle announced in Lemon I. 
-
.:%>u.prcme <!f 1ntrt of tq c 'J[luifrb $)tat cs 
~asqittgurn, gl. <q. 21JbiJt2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JusT,cE wM. J . BRENNAN, JR. March 26, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1470 Lemon v. Kurtzman 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 





~up-rtmt (qourt of t4t 'Jtlnittb j;tattg 
JragJpngton. tD. (q. 2llffeJi~ 
C ... AMB!::RS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
March 26, 1973 
71-1470, Lemon v. Kurtzman 
Dear Bill, 
Please add my name to your dissenting 
opinion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copies to the Conference 




JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tm.t <qttttrt of tlrt ~nittb ~mtts 
-ufringfott. ~- <q. 2!lffe'1-.;t 
March 27, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1470 - Lemon v. Kurtzman 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
ff. (.I. f:>. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
• - • 
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